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Abstract : The authors argue that the word “critical” in the title is not purely literary. Based
on their and other previous work on nonlinear complex dynamical systems, they summarize present
evidence, on the Oct. 1929, Oct. 1987, Oct. 1987 Hong-Kong, Aug. 1998 global market events and
on the 1985 Forex event, for the hypothesis advanced three years ago that stock market crashes are
caused by the slow buildup of long-range correlations between traders leading to a collapse of the
stock market in one critical instant.
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1 Crashes are outliers
It is well-known that the distributions of stock market returns exhibit “fat tails”, deviating signif-
icantly from the time-honored Gaussian description : a 5% dayly loss occurs approximately once
every two years while the Gaussian framework would predict one such loss in about a thousand year.
Crashes are of an even more extreme nature. We have measured the number N(D) of times a
given level of drawn down D has been observed in this century in the Dow Jones daily Average [1].
A draw down is defined as the cumulative loss from the last local maximum to the next minimum.
N(D) is well fitted by an exponential law
N(D) = N0 e
−D/Dc , with Dc ≈ 1.8% . (1)
However, we find that three events stand out blatantly. In chronological order: World War 1 (the
second largest), Wall Street Oct. 1929 (the third largest) and Wall Street Oct. 1987 (the largest).
Each of these draw down lasted about three days. Extrapolating the exponential fit (1), we estimate
that the return time of a draw down equal to or larger than 28.8% would be more than 160 centuries.
In contrast, the market has sustained two such events in less than a century. This suggests a natural
unambiguous definition for a crash, as an outlier, i.e., an extraordinary event with an amplitude
above ≈ 15% [1].
Large price movements are often modeled as Poisson-driven jump processes. This accounts
for the bulk of the statistics. However, the fact that large crashes are outliers implies that they
are probably controlled by different amplifying factors, which can lead to observable precursory
signatures. Here, we propose that large stock market crashes are analogous to “critical points”, a
technical term in Physics which refers to regimes of large-scale cooperative behavior such as close
to the Curie temperature when the millions of tiny magnets in a bar magnet start to influence each
other and eventually end up all pointing in one direction. We present the theory and then test it
against facts.
2 A rational imitation model of crashes
Our model contains the following ingredients [2] :
1. A system of traders who are influenced by their “neighbors”;
2. Local imitation propagating spontaneously into global cooperation;
3. Global cooperation among traders causing crash;
4. Prices related to the properties of this system.
The interplay between the progressive strengthening of imitation controlled by the three first
ingredients and the ubiquity of noise requires a stochastic description. A crash is not certain but
can be characterized by its hazard rate h(t), i.e., the probability per unit time that the crash will
happen in the next instant if it has not happened yet.
The crash hazard rate h(t) embodies subtle uncertainties of the market : when will the traders
realize with sufficient clarity that the market is overvalued? When will a significant fraction of
them believe that the bullish trend is not sustainable? When will they feel that other traders think
that a crash is coming? Nowhere is Keynes’s beauty contest analogy more relevant than in the
characterization of the crash hazard rate, because the survival of the bubble rests on the overall
confidence of investors in the market bullish trend.
A crash happens when a large group of agents place sell orders simultaneously. This group of
agents must create enough of an imbalance in the order book for market makers to be unable to
absorb the other side without lowering prices substantially. One curious fact is that the agents in
this group typically do not know each other. They did not convene a meeting and decide to provoke
a crash. Nor do they take orders from a leader. In fact, most of the time, these agents disagree with
one another, and submit roughly as many buy orders as sell orders (these are all the times when a
crash does not happen). The key question is to determine by what mechanism did they suddenly
manage to organise a coordinated sell-off?
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We propose the following answer [2] : all the traders in the world are organised into a network
(of family, friends, colleagues, etc) and they influence each other locally through this network : for
instance, an active trader is constantly on the phone exchanging information and opinions with a
set of selected colleagues. In addition, there are indirect interactions mediated for instance by the
media. Specifically, if I am directly connected with k other traders, then there are only two forces
that influence my opinion: (a) the opinions of these k people and of the global information network;
and (b) an idiosyncratic signal that I alone generate. Our working assumption here is that agents
tend to imitate the opinions of their connections. The force (a) will tend to create order, while force
(b) will tend to create disorder. The main story here is a fight between order and disorder. As far
as asset prices are concerned, a crash happens when order wins (everybody has the same opinion:
selling), and normal times are when disorder wins (buyers and sellers disagree with each other and
roughly balance each other out). We must stress that this is exactly the opposite of the popular
characterisation of crashes as times of chaos. Disorder, or a balanced and varied opinion spectrum,
is what keeps the market liquid in normal times. This mechanism does not require an overarching
coordination mechanism since macro-level coordination can arise from micro-level imitation and it
relies on a realistic model of how agents form opinions by constant interactions.
In the spirit of “mean field” theory of collective systems [3], the simplest way to describe an
imitation process is to assume that the hazard rate h(t) evolves according to the following equation :
dh
dt
= C hδ , with δ > 1 , (2)
where C is a positive constant. Mean field theory amounts to embody the diversity of trader actions
by a single effective representative behavior determined from an average interaction between the
traders. In this sense, h(t) is the collective result of the interactions between traders. The term hδ
in the r.h.s. of (2) accounts for the fact that the hazard rate will increase or decrease due to the
presence of interactions between the traders. The exponent δ > 1 quantifies the effective number
equal to δ − 1 of interactions felt by a typical trader. The condition δ > 1 is crucial to model
interactions and is, as we now show, essential to obtain a singularity (critical point) in finite time.
Indeed, integrating (2), we get
h(t) =
B
(tc − t)α
, with α ≡
1
δ − 1
. (3)
The critical time tc is determined by the initial conditions at some origin of time. The exponent α
must lie between zero and one for an economic reason : otherwise, as we shall see, the price would
go to infinity when approaching tc (if the bubble has not crashed in the mean time). This condition
translates into 2 < δ < +∞ : a typical trader must be connected to more than one other trader.
There is a large body of literature in Physics, Biology and Mathematics on the microscopic modeling
of systems of stochastic dynamical interacting agents that lead to critical behaviors of the type (3)
[4]. The macroscopic model (2) can thus be substantiated by specific microscopic models [2].
The critical time tc signals the death of the speculative bubble. We stress that tc is not the time
of the crash because the crash could happen at any time before tc, even though this is not very
likely. tc is the most probable time of the crash. There exists a finite probability
1−
∫ tc
t0
h(t)dt > 0 (4)
of “landing” smoothly, i.e. of attaining the end of the bubble without crash. This residual probability
is crucial for the coherence of the model, because otherwise agents would anticipate the crash and
not remain in the market.
Assume for simplicity that, during a crash, the price drops by a fixed percentage κ ∈ (0, 1), say
between 20 and 30% of the price increase above a reference value p1. Then, the dynamics of the
asset price before the crash are given by:
dp = µ(t) p(t) dt− κ[p(t)− p1]dj , (5)
where j denotes a jump process whose value is zero before the crash and one afterwards. In this
simplified model, we neglect interest rate, risk aversion, information asymmetry, and the market-
clearing condition.
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As a first-order approximation of the market organization, we assume that traders do their
best and price the asset so that a fair game condition holds. Mathematically, this stylized rational
expectation model is equivalent to the familiar martingale hypothesis:
∀t′ > t Et[p(t
′)] = p(t) (6)
where p(t) denotes the price of the asset at time t and Et[·] denotes the expectation conditional on
information revealed up to time t. If we do not allow the asset price to fluctuate under the impact
of noise, the solution to Equation (6) is a constant: p(t) = p(t0), where t0 denotes some initial time.
p(t) can be interpreted as the price in excess of the fundamental value of the asset.
Putting (5) in (6) leads to
µ(t)p(t) = κ[p(t)− p1]h(t) . (7)
In words, if the crash hazard rate h(t) increases, the return µ increases to compensate the traders
for the increasing risk. Plugging (7) into (5), we obtain a ordinary differential equation. For
p(t)− p(t0) < p(t0)− p1, its solution is
p(t) ≈ p(t0) + κ[p(t0)− p1]
∫ t
t0
h(t′)dt′ before the crash. (8)
This regime applies to the relatively short time scales of two to three years prior to the crash shown
below.
The higher the probability of a crash, the faster the price must increase (conditional on having
no crash) in order to satisfy the martingale (no free lunch) condition. Intuitively, investors must be
compensated by the chance of a higher return in order to be induced to hold an asset that might
crash. This effect may go against the naive preconception that price is adversely affected by the
probability of the crash, but our result is the only one consistent with rational expectations.
Using (3) into (8) gives the following price law:
p(t) ≈ pc −
κB
β
× (tc − t)
β before the crash. (9)
where β = 1 − α ∈ (0, 1) and pc is the price at the critical time (conditioned on no crash having
been triggered). The price before the crash follows a power law with a finite upper bound pc. The
trend of the price becomes unbounded as we approach the critical date. This is to compensate for
an unbounded crash rate in the next instant.
3 Log-periodicity
The last ingredient of the model is to recognize that the stock market is made of actors which differs
in size by many orders of magnitudes ranging from individuals to gigantic professional investors, such
as pension funds. Furthermore, structures at even higher levels, such as currency influence spheres
(US$, Euro, YEN ...), exist and with the current globalisation and de-regulation of the market
one may argue that structures on the largest possible scale, i.e., the world economy, are beginning
to form. This means that the structure of the financial markets have features which resembles
that of hierarchical systems with “traders” on all levels of the market. Of course, this does not
imply that any strict hierarchical structure of the stock market exists, but there are numerous
examples of qualitatively hierarchical structures in society. Models [2, 5] of imitative interactions
on hierarchical structures recover the power law behavior (9). But in addition, they predict that
the critical exponent α can be a complex number! The first order expansion of the general solution
for the hazard rate is then
h(t) ≈ B0(tc − t)
−α +B1(tc − t)
−α cos[ω log(tc − t) + ψ]. (10)
Once again, the crash hazard rate explodes near the critical date. In addition, it now displays
log-periodic oscillations. The evolution of the price before the crash and before the critical date is
given by:
p(t) ≈ pc −
κ
β
{
B0(tc − t)
β +B1(tc − t)
β cos[ω log(tc − t) + φ]
}
(11)
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where φ is another phase constant. The key feature is that oscillations appear in the price of the
asset before the critical date. The local maxima of the function are separated by time intervals that
tend to zero at the critical date, and do so in geometric progression, i.e., the ratio of consecutive
time intervals is a constant
λ ≡ e
2pi
ω . (12)
This is very useful from an empirical point of view because such oscillations are much more strik-
ingly visible in actual data than a simple power law : a fit can “lock in” on the oscillations which
contain information about the critical date tc. Note that complex exponents and log-periodic oscil-
lations do not necessitate a pre-existing hierarchical structure as mentioned above, but may emerge
spontaneously from the non-linear complex dynamics of markets [6].
In Natural Sciences, critical points are widely considered to be one of the most interesting
properties of complex systems. A system goes critical when local influences propagate over long
distances and the average state of the system becomes exquisitely sensitive to a small perturbation,
i.e., different parts of the system becomes highly correlated. Another characteristic is that critical
systems are self-similar across scales: in our example, at the critical point, an ocean of traders who
are mostly bullish may have within it several islands of traders who are mostly bearish, each of which
in turns surrounds lakes of bullish traders with islets of bearish traders; the progression continues
all the way down to the smallest possible scale: a single trader [7]. Intuitively speaking, critical
self-similarity is why local imitation cascades through the scales into global coordination.
4 Fitting the crashes
Details on our numerical procedure are given in [2]. Figures 1-3 show the behavior of the market
index prior to the four crashes of Oct. 1929 (Fig.1), Aug. 1998, Oct. 1997 (Hong-Kong) (Fig.2) and
of Oct. 1987 (Fig.3). In addition, Fig. 3 shows the US $ expressed in DEM and CHF currencies
before the collapse of the bubble in 1985. A fit with Eq. (11) is shown as a continuous line for each
event. The table summarises the key parameters. Note the small fluctuations in the value of the
scaling ratio 2.2 ≤ λ ≤ 2.7 for the 4 stock market crashes. This agreement constitutes one of the key
test of our theory. Rather remarkably, the scaling ratio for the DEM and CHF currencies against
the US$ is comparable.
crash tc tmax tmin % drop β ω λ
1929 30.22 29.65 29.87 46.9% 0.45 7.9 2.2
1985 (DEM) 85.20 85.15 85.30 14% 0.28 6.0 2.8
1985 (CHF) 85.19 85.18 85.30 15% 0.36 5.2 3.4
1987 87.74 87.65 87.80 29.7% 0.33 7.4 2.3
1997 (H-K) 97.74 97.60 97.82 46.2% 0.34 7.5 2.3
1998 98.72 98.55 98.67 19.4% 0.60 6.4 2.7
Table : tc is the critical time predicted from the fit of the market index to the Eq. (11). The other
parameters β, ω and λ of the fit are also shown. The fit is performed up to the time tmax at which
the market index achieved its highest maximum before the crash. tmin is the time of the lowest
point of the market. The percentage drop is calculated from the total loss from tmax to tmin.
In order to investigate the significance of these results, we picked at random fifty 400-week
intervals in the period 1910 to 1996 of the Dow Jones average and launched the fitting procedure
described in [2] on these surrogate data sets. The results were very encouraging. Of the eleven fits
with a quality of fit comparable with that of the other crashes, only six data sets produced values
for β and ω which were in the same range. All six fits belonged to the periods prior to the crashes
of 1929, 1962 and 1987. The existence of a “crash” in 1962 was before these results unknown to us
and the identification of this crash naturally strengthens the case. We refer the reader to [2] for a
presentation of the best fit obtained for this “crash”.
In the last few weeks before a crash, the market indices shown in Fig. 1-3 depart from the final
acceleration predicted by Eq. 5 : this is the regime where the hazard rate becomes extremely high,
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the market becomes more and more sensitive to “shocks” and the market idiosyncrasies are bound
to have an increasing impact. Within the theory of critical phenomena, it is well-known that the
singular behavior of the observable, here the hazard rate or the rate of change of the stock market
index, will be smoothed out by the finiteness of the market. Technically, this is referred to as a
“finite-size effect”.
In order to qualify further the significance of the log-periodic oscillations in a non-parametric
way, we have eliminated the leading trend from the price data by the following transformation
p (t)→
p (t)−
[
pc −
κ
βB0(tc − t)
β
]
κ
βB1(tc − t)
β
, (13)
which should leave us with a pure cos[ω log(tc − t) + φ] if no other effects were present. In figure
4, we see this residue prior to the 1987 crash with a very convincing periodic trend as a function
of log
(
tc−t
tc
)
. We estimated the significance of this trend by using a so-called Lomb periodogram
for the four index crashes and the two bubble collapse on the Forex considered here. The Lomb
periodogram is a local fit of a cosine (with a phase) using some user chosen range of frequencies.
In figure 5, we see a peak around f ≈ 1.1 for all six cases corresponding to ω = 2pif ≈ 7 in perfect
agreement with the previous results. We note that only the relative level of the peak for each
separate periodogram should be regarded a measure of the significance of the oscillations. Since the
nature of the “noise” is unknown and very likely different for each crash, we cannot estimate the
confidence interval of the peak and compare the results for the different crashes. We also note, the
the strength of the oscillations is ≈ 5% of the leading power law behaviour for all 6 cases signfiying
that they cannot be neglegted.
5 Towards a prediction of the next crash?
How long time prior to a crash can one identify the log-periodic signatures? Not only one would like
to predict future crashes, but it is important to further test how robust our results are. Obviously,
if the log-periodic structure of the data is purely accidental, then the parameter values obtained
should depend heavily on the size of the time interval used in the fitting. We have thus carried out
a systematic testing procedure [2] using a second order expansion of the hazard rate [8] and a time
interval of 8 years prior to the two crashes of 1929 and 1987. The general picture we obtain is the
following. For the Oct. 1987 crash, a year or more before a crash, the data is not sufficient to give
any conclusive results. Approximately a year before the crash, the fit begins to lock-in on the date
of the crash with increasing precision and our procedure becomes robust. However, if one wants to
actually predict the time of the crash, a major obstacle is the fact that several possible dates are
possible. In addition, the fit in general “over-shoot” the true day of the crash. For the Oct. 1929
crash, we have to wait until approximately 4 month before the crash for the fit to lock in on the date
of the crash, but from that point the picture is the same as for the crash in Oct. 1987. We caution
the reader that jumping in the prediction game may be hazardous and misleading : one deals with
a delicate optimization problem that requires extensive back and forward testing. Furthermore, the
formulas given here are only “first-order” approximations and novel improved methods are needed
[9]. Finally, one must never forget that the crash has to remain in part a random event in order to
exist!
A general trend for the analysis of the five crashes presented here is that the critical tc obtained
from fitting the data tends to over-shoot the time of the crash. This observation is fully consistent
with our rational expectation model of a crash. Indeed, tc is not the time of the crash but the most
probable value of the skewed distribution of the possible times of the crash. The occurrence of the
crash is a random phenomenon which occurs with a probability that increases as time approaches tc.
Thus, we expect that fits will give values of tc which are in general close to but systematically later
than the real time of the crash. The phenomenon of “overshot” that we have clearly documented
[2] is thus fully consistent with the theory.
It is a striking observation that essentially similar crashes have punctuated this century, notwith-
standing tremendous changes in all imaginable ways of life and work. The only thing that has prob-
ably little changed are the way humans think and behave. The concept that emerges here is that
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the organization of traders in financial markets leads intrinsically to “systemic instabilities”, that
probably result in a very robust way from the fundamental nature of human beings, including our
gregarious behavior, our greediness, our reptilian psychology during panics and crowd behavior and
our risk aversion. The global behavior of the market, with its log-periodic structures that emerge
as a result of the cooperative behavior of traders, is reminiscent of the process of the emergence of
intelligent behavior at a macroscopic scale that individuals at the microscopic scale have not idea of.
This process has been discussed in biology for instance in animal populations such as ant colonies
or in connection with the emergence of consciousness [10].
anders@moho.ess.ucla.edu
sornette@cyclop.ess.ucla.edu
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Figure 1: The Dow Jones index prior to the October 1929 crash on Wall Street. The fit is equation
(11) with pc ≈ 571,
κ
βB0 ≈ −267,
κ
βB1 ≈ 14.3, β ≈ 0.45, tc ≈ 30.22, φ ≈ 1.0, ω ≈ 7.9.
8
400
500
600
700
800
900
1000
1100
1200
1300
1400
95 95.5 96 96.5 97 97.5 98 98.5
S&
P5
00
Date
HK
WS
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
16000
18000
H
an
g 
Se
ng
Figure 2: The Hang Seng index prior to the October 1997 crash on the Hong-Kong Stock Exchange
and the S&P 500 stock market index prior to the recent crash on Wall Street in August 1998. The
fit to the Hang Seng index is equation (11) with pc ≈ 20077,
κ
βB0 ≈ −8241,
κ
βB1 ≈ −397, β ≈ 0.34,
tc ≈ 97.74, φ ≈ 0.78, ω ≈ 7.5. The fit to the S&P 500 index is equation (11) with pc ≈ 1321,
κ
βB0 ≈ −402,
κ
βB1 ≈ 19.7, β ≈ 0.60, tc ≈ 98.72, φ ≈ 0.75, ω ≈ 6.4.
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Figure 3: The S& P 500 US index prior to the October 1987 crash on Wall Street and the US $
against DEM and CHF prior to the collapse mid-85. The fit to the S&P 500 is equation (11) with
pc ≈ 412,
κ
βB0 ≈ −165,
κ
βB1 ≈ 12.2, β ≈ 0.33, tc ≈ 87.74, φ ≈ 2.0, ω ≈ 7.4. The fits to the DM
and CHF currencies against the US dollar gives pc ≈ 3.88,
κ
βB0 ≈ −1.2,
κ
βB1 ≈ 0.08, β ≈ 0.28,
tc ≈ 85.20, φ ≈ −1.2, ω ≈ 6.0 and pc ≈ 3.1,
κ
βB0 ≈ −0.86,
κ
βB1 ≈ 0.05, β ≈ 0.36, tc ≈ 85.19,
φ ≈ −0.59, ω ≈ 5.2, respectively.
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for the
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Figure 5: The Lomb periodogram for the 1929, 1987 and 1998 crashes and Wall Street, the 1997
crash on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and the 1985 US $ currency crash in 1985. For each
periodogram, the significance of the peak should be estimated against the noise level.
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